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Democracy at a Stalemate
The September 2004 Legco Elections in Hong Kong
Ma Ngok
1 Despite a recent rekindling of the democracy movement in the territory Hong Kong’s
Democrats failed to make much ground in the Legco elections of September last year.
They had hoped to capture a majority in the semi-democratic legislature, but managed
to win only 25 out of 60 seats. This disappointing result has weakened their bargaining
power with the Central People’s Government with respect to future political reforms in
Hong  Kong.  Peking  may  have  breathed  a  sigh  of  relief  at  this  outcome,  but  the
governing crisis of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) is showing
little sign of improving. The failure of the Democrats to gain a majority may further
delay political reform in Hong Kong, and this will serve to prolong or aggravate the
crisis of governance in the SAR. 
2 The September 2004 elections came on the heels of successive massive demonstrations
in Hong Kong in support of more rapid democratisation. This article will first discuss
the recent political developments in Hong Kong in the lead-up to the elections, showing
how a rebirth of the democracy movement in Hong Kong has led to Peking’s change in
its  policy  towards  Hong  Kong.  Specifically,  Peking  has  become  more  pro-active  in
affairs regarding Hong Kong after 2003, trying hard to prevent the Democrats from
gaining  a  majority  in  the  2004  elections.  The  Democrats  saw  the  elections  as  a
referendum on democracy for Hong Kong, but failed to make a marked improvement in
overall level of voter support in the campaign. Although the democrats managed to get
60% of the popular vote, the semi-democratic nature of the system prevented them
from seizing a majority. The elections returned a more pluralised legislature, with the
government’s majority diminished but secure, which may mean further challenges and
governance difficulties for the SAR government. 
From Article 23 to articles 45 and 68: the rebirth of the democracy movement
3 Hong Kong may have one of the slowest paces of democratisation in the contemporary
world. While a colony, the all-powerful colonial Governor was appointed from London,
who,  up  to  1985,  appointed  his  major  officials  and  all  Legislative  Council  (Legco)
members. By Legco appointment system, the colonial government co-opted business
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and professional leaders to defuse possible social opposition to government policy, and
built a “synarchy” of colonial bureaucrats and local elites1. After the Sino-British Joint
Declaration of 1984 made it imperative for Britain to return Hong Kong to China, the
British  began  to  push  for  gradual  democratisation  in  Hong  Kong.  The  number  of
popularly elected seats increased very slowly: it took 13 years for the proportion of
popularly elected seats to increase from 30% in 1991 to 50% in 2004 (see Table 1), the
remaining  50%  returned  by  “functional  constituencies”  that  represented  major
business and professional groups. The SAR Chief Executive (CE), who inherited most of
the powers of the colonial Governor, is elected by an Election Committee of 800 people
that represented mostly the major business and professional groups. 
 
1. The composition of the Hong Kong Legislative Council
4 Decolonisation and gradual democratisation from above in the 1980s promptly gave
rise to a local democracy movement. In the late 1980s, 95 groups from the civil society
formed a grand coalition of democrats to fight for a more democratic political formula
in  the  Basic  Law,  Hong  Kong’s  mini-constitution  after  19972.  Their  efforts  were
thwarted by a holy alliance of Peking and local business conservatives, who claimed
that rapid democratisation would bring instability and/or a welfare state, hurting Hong
Kong’s  status  as  a  low-tax  capitalist  haven3.  The  Basic  Law,  promulgated  in  1990,
stipulated  a  very  gradual  pace  of  democratisation,  although  it  does  guarantee
“ultimate”  election  of  the  CE  and  the  whole  of  Legco  by  universal  suffrage.  The
democracy movement in Hong Kong, meanwhile, was spurred on by the Tiananmen
crackdown of 1989. One million Hong Kong people took to the streets that spring to
support the mainland movement. Support for democracy, fear of China’s intervention
after  1997,  and  defending  Hong  Kong’s  freedom  and  autonomy  suddenly  became
synonyms. In the partially-democratic Legco elections in 1991 and 1995, the democrats
enjoyed great success in the popular elections, taking up a sizeable minority in the
Legco. 
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5 The democracy movement lost its momentum somewhat after 1997, partly because of
the lack of ostensible intervention from the mainland. With great restraint, Peking’s
leaders more or less let the SAR government run its own course after 1997. Running on
a largely anti-communist platform, the Democrats’ political agenda began to lose some
of its appeal after 1997. An economic downturn triggered by the Asian financial crisis
also  turned  the  people’s  attention  away  from  politics  to  bread-and-butter  issues4.
Differences within the pro-democracy camp surfaced concerning the future direction
of the democracy movement, leading to infighting and factional struggles that hurt the
moral image of the democrats5. The 2000 Legco election marked a low point of the pro-
democracy forces in Hong Kong, with pro-democracy candidates getting 57% of the
popular vote (yes, 57% of the votes was a historic low for the democrats in Hong Kong),
with  the  pro-Peking  Democratic  Alliance  for  the  Betterment  of  Hong  Kong  (DAB)
getting 30%, greatly closing the gap with the democrats. Political conservatives have
dominated  the  functional  constituencies  (FCs)  since  their  inception  in  1985  as  the
business sector in Hong Kong has generally been politically conservative,  and most
wished  not  to  antagonise  the  Central  or  the  SAR  governments  on  the  issue  of
democracy, for fear of hurting their business interests in the mainland. With the FCs
taking up half  of  the Legco seats after 1997,  the SAR government enjoyed majority
support in Legco from 1997 to 2004, with the democrats getting about 21-22 seats in the
60-strong Legco.  
6 For the ailing democracy movement in Hong Kong, the SAR government’s proposal in
2002 to enact national security laws was a godsend. According to Article 23 of the Basic
Law, “The HKSAR shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession,
sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets,
to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities
in the Region,  and to  prohibit  political  organizations or  bodies  of  the Region from
establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies”6. Human rights activists
and democrats alike had always feared that the related laws would be used to curb
peaceful  protest  in  Hong  Kong,  especially  against  Hong  Kong  democrats  who  had
provided so much support to the mainland dissidents during the 1989 movement. 
7 The National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill, tabled to the Legco in February 2003,
was criticised by legal professionals and human rights activists as too vague and ill-
defined, and allegedly open to abuse by the authorities to prosecute peaceful protest in
Hong  Kong7.  Opinion  polls  showed  that  a  majority  of  public  opinion  opposed  the
government’s  proposals8.  Backed  by  a  pro-government  majority  in  Legco,  the  SAR
government was confident they could push through the Bill and ignored the democrats’
call  to  delay  the  Second  Reading  of  the  Bill  scheduled  for  July  9th  2003.  The
government’s  proposals  led  to  an  unprecedented  mobilisation  of  civil  society,  with
religious  groups,  professional  leaders  and  other  civil  groups  calling  on  Hong  Kong
citizens to oppose the legislation. Hong Kong citizens were also greatly dissatisfied with
the performance of the SAR government since 1997, particularly its handling of the
SARS  epidemic  in  spring  2003,  which  led  to  299  deaths  in  Hong  Kong.  The
demonstration on July 1st 2003, a last-ditch effort to oppose the National Security Bill,
became an anti-government protest  on a massive scale.  An estimated 500,000 Hong
Kong citizens marched in the streets of Hong Kong, forcing the SAR government to
withdraw the Bill days later. 
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8 The  movement  against  Article  23  quickly  became  a  fully-fledged  movement  for
democracy.  The  democrats  claimed  that  the  SAR  government  was  not  popularly
elected, and would be likely therefore to defy public opinion and propose legislation
that  threatened  basic  freedoms.  They  also  claimed  that  since  Legco  was  not  fully
democratic, it could not effectively reflect public opinion and would enact laws that
would not be in the people’s interests. Article 45 of the Basic Law promises that the CE
will  ultimately  be  elected  by  universal  suffrage,  while  Article  68  stipulates  that  all
Legco  will  be  popularly  elected.  Neither  article  specifies  the  timing  of  universal
suffrage. The Basic Law only specifies the methods for electing the CE and Legco up to
2004. The democrats lost no time in pushing for election of the CE by universal suffrage
in 2007, and a fully popularly-elected Legco in 2008. The July 1st demonstration, the
largest social movement since 1989, gave the democrats a great confidence boost. They
asserted that election of the CE and the whole of Legco by universal suffrage would be
the  best  way  to  protect  the  interests  of  the  Hong  Kong  people,  and  to  cure  the
post-1997  governing  ills  of  Hong  Kong.  Opinion  polls  in  late  2003  showed  that  an
overwhelming  majority  (as  much  as  over  80%)  of  Hong  Kong  citizens  supported
election by universal suffrage in 2007/089. 
Peking’s changing policies towards Hong Kong 
9 The  rebirth  of  the  democracy  movement  in  Hong  Kong  greatly  alarmed Peking  as
Peking has never been ready to grant full democracy to Hong Kong. After 1989, the
Peking  authorities  were  particularly  suspicious  of  the  leaders  of  the  democracy
movement  in  Hong  Kong,  who  played  an  active  role  in  supporting  the  Tiananmen
movement in 1989,  and had travelled abroad extensively  after  1989 to  criticise  the
Chinese government on issues of human rights and democracy. Before 2003, Peking was
largely content with the situation in the HKSAR, since the democrats were kept mostly
in  check  as  a  minority  in  Legco,  their  popularity  declining  and  the  movement’s
momentum weakening. The 500,000-people demonstration on July 1st 2003 changed
this view. First and foremost Peking’s leaders were concerned about the social stability
of Hong Kong, fearing that the SAR government, low in legitimacy, could not handle
the challenge of  further mobilisation.  The Central  Government was also afraid that
riding  the  tide  the  democrats  could  win  a  majority  in  the  September  2004  Legco
elections. The landslide victory of the democrats in the November 2003 District Council
elections10 made Peking’s leaders fear that a similar victory for the democrats was on
the cards in September 2004. Although the CE holds most of the policy-making power in
the executive-dominant  system of  the HKSAR,  Legco could still  thwart  government
initiatives by vetoing government bills and the annual budget, possibly meaning the
Centre losing control over the situation in Hong Kong. 
10 The  Central  Government  began  to  take  more  initiative  in  Hong  Kong  affairs.  To
forestall a possible landslide for the democrats in the 2004 election, Peking began to
change both its economic and political strategies towards Hong Kong. It began to step
up measures to help Hong Kong’s economy recover. To the leaders in Peking, much of
the anti-government sentiment in Hong Kong was due to the economic downturn after
1997 and the inability of the SAR government to deal with it. They believed a rapid
economic  recovery  would  weaken the  appeal  of  the  pro-democracy  opposition  and
would also help the pro-government/pro-Peking parties who had shared part of the
blame for the unsatisfactory performance of the SAR government. 
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11 Economic assistance plans had been under consideration for some time, but after July
2003 the Central Government took steps to speed up the process. Key in the economic
assistance proposals was the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between
the mainland and Hong Kong11. Hong Kong companies in the service sectors, including
management  consultancy,  real  estate  and  construction,  healthcare,  law,  banking,
accounting, etc., were given access to the Guangdong market by the CEPA agreement
signed in September 2003. Hong Kong’s exports to Guangdong would face zero tariffs,
with similar benefits soon to be extended to exports to other provinces. The Central
Government  also  relaxed  its  controls  on  mainland  tourists  coming  to  Hong  Kong.
Starting  from  July  2003,  tourists  from  four  mainland  cities  (Dongguan,  Foshan,
Jiangmen  and  Zhongshan)  were  allowed  to  come  to  Hong  Kong  on  their  own,  not
obliged  to  visit  only  on  a  state-organised  tour.  In  2004,  this  “individual  tourism”
scheme  was  extended  to  more  mainland  cities,  immediately  boosting  Hong  Kong’s
tourist  income.  This  was  followed by a  series  of  infrastructure  projects  that  would
speed up the integration of Hong Kong with the Pearl River Delta region, including a
Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau bridge which many believed would strengthen Hong Kong’s
status as the logistics hub of southern China. In addition to aiding a quicker recovery of
Hong Kong’s economy, these measures could show that the Central Government cared
about and was willing to help Hong Kong.  Increased economic integration between
Hong Kong and the mainland also made the business and professional sectors in Hong
Kong more dependent on the mainland for business opportunities, which allowed the
Central Government to wield more formal and informal influence on the local elites12.
12 On the political front, Peking tried to kill off hopes for full democracy in 2007/08 before
the elections, so that the democrats could not use the political goal as the campaign
issue of the 2004 election. Peking began a barrage of propaganda against the Hong Kong
democrats in early 2004 through a series of articles in mainland mouthpieces such as
the China Daily, People’s Daily and the Xinhua News Agency. The articles accused the
democrats of being unpatriotic, of inviting foreign intervention in Hong Kong affairs,
and of trying to change the mainland socialist system. They claimed that Hong Kong
could only be governed by people who “love China, love Hong Kong” (WWWW, aiguo
aigang),  and  it  would  be  dangerous  for  Hong  Kong  to  have  full  democracy  if  the
elections could not guarantee that those elected are aiguo aigang13.
13 In  April  2004,  the  Standing  Committee  of  the  National  People’s  Congress  (NPCSC)
virtually eliminated the possibility of full democracy in 2007/08 by handing down a
new interpretation of the Basic Law. The NPCSC resolved that although the methods of
election for the 2007 CE and the 2008 Legco could be changed, the CE in 2007 and Legco
in 2008 would not be fully elected by universal suffrage. The NPCSC further ruled that
the proportion of popularly elected seats and functional seats would remain unchanged
in  the  2008  Legco  elections,  meaning  that  each  would  make  up half  of  Legco  in
2008-2012. Democrats in Hong Kong criticised the resolution as a blatant violation of
the “One Country,  Two Systems” principle and the autonomy of Hong Kong, as the
Basic Law did not say that the NPCSC can decide the scope and pace of political reform
for the SAR14.
14 It was also reported that the mainland authorities were actively involved in helping the
pro-Peking parties in the 2004 election. In April and May 2004, it was widely reported in
Hong Kong that mainland officials had put pressure on Hong Kong citizens who worked
on the mainland, forcing the latter to mobilise their relatives and friends to register as
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voters.  Mainland  officials  also  reportedly  told  Hong  Kong  businessmen to  pressure
their  employees  to  vote  for  pro-Peking  candidates  in  the  September  election15.
Mainland  city  and  county  officials  visited  Hong  Kong  and  met  the  corresponding
hometown  associations  before  the  election,  allegedly  asking  the  associations  to
mobilise  their  members  to  vote  for  the  pro-Peking  candidates16.  There  were  also
complaints  that  mainland  officials  had  asked  employees  from  Hong  Kong  to  send
photos of their ballot paper by mobile phone to prove they had voted for pro-Peking
candidates17. 
15 Back in Hong Kong, after July 2003 the SAR government largely refrained from raising
controversial  policies,  for  fear  of  stirring  further  social  mobilisation  against  the
government, which they believed would only benefit the democrats. In September 2003
the SAR government announced that it would not raise the National Security Bill before
the 2004 election, although in doing so it would risk never being able to pass it again
should the democrats get a majority in Legco after the election. In the 2004/05 annual
budget, the Financial Secretary did not raise any taxes, despite a looming budget deficit
of HK$49 billion in the 2003/04 financial year. The government also announced that it
would  postpone  its  original  plans  to  balance  the  budget  by  2007  to  2008/09,  thus
alleviating immediate pressure on the government to cut back on social services and
civil  service  salaries.  The general  strategy was to  refrain from taking controversial
action  nearing  election  time,  to  avoid  giving  further  ammunition  to  the  political
opposition to fan anti-government sentiments. 
The campaign Co-ordination within the two camps 
16 Both the pro-democracy camp and the pro-Peking camp put a great deal of effort into
co-ordinating  their  candidates  within  their  camps  before  the  election.  Hong  Kong
adopted a proportional representation system for the 30 popularly-elected seats, with
Hong Kong divided into five constituencies, each electing four to eight Legco members.
The seats were allocated roughly in accordance with the proportion of votes obtained
by  a  party/candidate  list.  With  the  large  number  of  pro-democracy  groups  and
candidates  willing  to  run  in  the  election,  the  democrats  thought  it  was  of  utmost
importance  that  they  co-ordinated  their  candidates  so  that  they  would  not  over-
nominate and hurt their own chances.  Political  science professor Joseph Cheng and
Reverend  Chu  Yiu-ming  took  up  the  next-to-impossible  task  of  liaising  among  the
various candidates. The task mostly involved asking candidates deemed to have little
chance  of  winning  to  withdraw,  and  finding  suitable  candidates  to  contest  the
functional  constituencies  (in  which the  democrats  had seldom participated before),
deciding if the pro-democracy candidates should be put onto one list or split across
different lists, and avoiding clashes between pro-democracy big guns. Both Cheng and
Chu admitted that the exercise has not been totally successful, as nobody in the pro-
democracy  camp  had  an  overriding  authority  to  dictate  the  candidate  nomination
within so many parties/groupings. But they saw the experience as positive, as the pre-
election liaisons provided a platform for the democrats to discuss their differences,
which minimised bickering in their camp during the campaign18. In the end, agreeing to
disagree, the pro-democracy camp ran 19 different lists in the five constituencies, and
fielded candidates to contest 11 functional constituencies. 
17 In comparison, the pro-Peking camp had a relative success asking weaker candidates to
withdraw. Candidates such as David Chu and Tang Shiu-tang, both incumbents from the
conservative  Hong  Kong  Progressive  Alliance  (HKPA),  withdrew  shortly  before  the
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election19.  The  DAB  also  liaised  with  the  pro-business  Liberal  Party  (LP)  in  the
functional  constituencies  to  avoid  mutual  competition  and  vote-splitting.  It  was
reported that the Central Government Liaison Office (CGLO)20 had been working hard to
liaise between different pro-Peking groups to work out the best co-ordination between
them21. 
The campaign issue
18 The major campaign issue of the 2004 election was, unsurprisingly, democratisation.
Although it did not sound very hopeful, the democrats ran on a common platform of
“universal suffrage for 2007/08”. The democrats claimed that there was still ample time
before 2007 to persuade the Central Government to change its mind on the issue of
universal suffrage. Specifically, the democrats claimed that if they could win a majority
or  close  to  a  majority  in  the  Legco  elections,  it  would  strengthen  their  hand  in
bargaining for universal suffrage with the Central Government. Seeing the election as
an important landmark in the democracy movement, the democrats urged the voters to
treat  the election as  a  referendum on democracy and cast  their  vote in support  of
democracy for Hong Kong. 
19 The pro-Peking camp was relatively defensive on the issue of political reform. They
claimed that it  was unrealistic  to insist  on full  democracy in 2007/08 now that the
NPCSC had handed down its verdict. The largest pro-Peking party, the DAB, claimed
that  “stability” and “harmony” as  most  important  for  Hong Kong’s  development,  a
campaign theme they had used in the 2000 elections. They accused the democrats of
being too confrontational against both the Central and the SAR governments, which
they claimed would only hurt Hong Kong’s stability and harmony. They warned that if
the  democrats  won  a  majority,  government  initiatives  would  face  much  undue
opposition,  which  would  lead  to  a  paralysis  of  the  government.  The  conservatives
asserted that  Hong Kong should focus its  energies  on economic recovery,  and they
could  better  help,  compared  to  the  democrats,  to  revive Hong Kong’s  economy by
making constructive proposals to the SAR and Central governments. On the issue of
political  reform, most conservatives said they now supported universal  suffrage for
both the CE and Legco in 2012. 
20 During  the  campaign  the  pro-democracy  candidates  relentlessly  attacked  the
conservatives’  stand  on  democratisation  and  their  past  records  in  supporting  the
government’s  unpopular  policies  and Article  23.  They branded the pro-government
candidates  the  “Royalists”,  pointing to  their  past  record of  supporting government
decisions at all costs. The democrats also told the voters not to trust the conservatives’
platform of universal suffrage by 2012. They claimed that the pro-Peking politicians
would always obey Peking’s orders, so if Peking later refuted democracy by 2012, the
pro-Peking parties would change their positions again. Veteran democrat Martin Lee,
former DP Chairman, teased that DAB was the acronym for “Democracy According to
Beijing”. The conservatives retorted that political reform must be gradual to ensure
stability and harmony, that all  reform must be approved by Peking, and that Hong
Kong was not ripe for full democracy. Instead they said that Hong Kong should focus on
economic  revival  for  the  time  being.  Campaign-wise  the  pro-Peking  DAB  mostly
focused  on  district-level  constituency  services.  Mobilisation  by  intermediary
organisations,  such as  the  pro-Peking  labour  unions22,  China-funded  enterprises,
conservative  neighbourhood  or  kaifong  organisations,  rural  committees,  and  other
pro-Peking mass organisations, was the DAB’s strong suit. 
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Negative campaigning 
21 At later stages of the campaign, scandals involving candidates stole the limelight. On
August 16th, a DP candidate, Alex Ho, was arrested in the mainland city of Dongguan,
for  allegedly  hiring  a  prostitute,  and  was  sent  without  trial  into  “administrative
detention” for  six  months.  The DP claimed a  political  set-up.  Four  days  before  the
election,  Dongguan police released “evidence” of  Ho’s  arrest,  showing pictures of  a
bare-chested Ho against a background of a hotel room. In late August, it was revealed
that DP incumbent legislator James To had used government allowances to buy private
premises  for  his  ward  office,  and  had  not  declared  his  ownership  of  shares  of  a
company  as  stipulated  by  law.  That  James  To’s  explanation  and  records  of  related
transactions were so unclear and confusing raised serious suspicions that he or the DP
had misused government funds to buy premises for themselves. One week later, Chen
Yuen-han, a DAB heavyweight, was involved in a scandal similar to To’s, but the case
received  far  less  media  coverage  largely  due  to  self-censorship  by  the  pro-Peking
papers and media in Hong Kong. 
22 The scandals dealt a certain blow to the DP’s popularity, credibility, and moral image.
Tracking polls showed that the DP candidate lists in the two constituencies involved
suffered a decline in voter support by 5-10%, with DP lists in other districts suffering a
smaller  loss.  The  loss  by  DP  may  not  have  benefited  the  pro-Peking  camp
tremendously, as polls showed that the lost votes were mostly picked up by other pro-
democracy candidates. 
Analysis of the results 
23 On September 12th 2004, a record 1.78 million Hong Kong citizens cast their votes in
the semi-democratic Legco elections, with a record turnout of 55.6%. There were quite
a few irregularities on polling day. In the afternoon some polling stations declared that
they had no more ballot boxes, and some stations had to be closed for some 45 minutes
and voters were turned away. Some candidates complained that polling station officials
had  opened  ballot  boxes  to  “squash”  the  ballot  papers  so  that  the  boxes  could
accommodate more ballot papers, without the consent of the candidates’ agents. The
authorities took some eight hours to release the exact voter turnout figures on polling
day23. In some constituencies, there were discrepancies between the number of ballots
cast  and  the  number  of  ballots  given  out.  Despite  all  these  irregularities,  the  SAR
government insisted the election was fair. 
24 The polling result was a disappointment for the democrats. They won only 25 seats, far
from the majority they had hoped for.  The pro-democracy flagship DP actually saw
their  seats  reduced from 11 to 9,  although other democrats  gained ground.  On the
whole,  the  pro-democracy  camp  picked  up  only  one  extra  seat  from  the  popular
election battlefront, and two from the FCs. The DP’s major political rivals, the DAB and
the  pro-business  conservative  Liberal  Party  (LP),  both  gained  seats  despite  the
unfavourable political  climate.  The pro-Peking DAB won two extra seats,  increasing
their total seats from 10 to 12 and became the largest party in Legco. The LP kept all
their eight seats in the FCs, and managed to win two seats in the popular elections for
their  Chairman  James  Tien  and  Vice  Chairlady  Selina  Chow.  Overall,  the  pro-
government  majority  was  secured but  somewhat  reduced in  margin,  with  the  pro-
government bloc taking up some 31-32 votes in the new Legco. 
25 The international media commonly saw the election as a victory for the pro-Peking
camp and a setback for the democrats. Strictly speaking this was inaccurate. The pro-
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democracy camp in fact won a minor increase in the overall vote share (see Table 2)
from 57% to 60.6%, although the increase was smaller than they had hoped for. The
DAB won a lower share of the vote than in 2000, down from 30% to 25%, although the
decrease was less than expected. The DAB picked up extra seats largely because they
managed to keep the original  share of  the vote in three of  the constituencies,  and
picked up the new seat added in those constituencies. With about 60% of the popular
vote, the democrats won 60% (18 out of 30) of the popularly-elected seats, which was
about right under the proportional representation system. They could have won one
more seat if not for a tactical mistake in the Hong Kong Island constituency24, even so
they could only have won a total 26 seats and could not have won a majority.  
 
2. Vote share
26 Comparing the vote shares obtained by the different political camps since 1991 (Table
2), we can see that the conservatives gained ground in the 2004 elections at the expense
of  the  moderates/independents.  In  particular,  candidates  such  as  Rita  Fan,  Legco
president  since  1997,  and  LP  heavyweights  James  Tien  and  Selina  Chow,  all  Legco
veterans for some twenty years running for direct election for the first time, attracted
much  of  the  moderate-conservative  voters.  Under  heavy  mobilisation  by  the  pro-
Peking camp, the democrats managed to hold their turf and made modest gains, but the
independents and moderates, who had tried to hold the middle ground between the
two  camps,  with  no  sizeable  organisational  support,  lost  out25.  The  rebirth  of  the
democracy movement since July 2003 may have rescued the continual decline of the
pro-democracy  parties  after  1997,  but  their  popularity  has  not  quite  returned  to
pre-1997 levels. Generally speaking, over the years the democrats have consolidated
support  of  around 60%,  remarkable  by  international  standards.  This  showed that  a
majority in Hong Kong consistently supported the democrats and/or a faster pace of
democratisation,  but  the  semi-democratic  nature  of  the  system  prevented  the
democrats from gaining either a legislative majority or executive power. 
27 There were other positive signs for the democrats. They picked up two new seats in two
functional constituencies that represent accountants and medical doctors respectively.
Before the election, the democrats had held five seats in the FCs. The two new seats
mean that the democrats now represent seven of the nine professional sectors in the
FCs,  which  testifies  to  the  support  of  the  middle  class  and  professionals  for
democracy26. 
28 Several factors could explain the failure of the democrats to make more significant
gains. The April verdict of the NPCSC certainly took the wind out of the democrats’
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sails. While most Hong Kong people would still support universal suffrage in 2007/08,
most knew that it was not very hopeful and the mobilisation effect of the campaign
theme was somewhat reduced. The democrats’ common platform on universal suffrage
managed to consolidate basic support for the democrats (which should form a large
part of that 60% share of the vote), but was perhaps unable to win over the moderates
or  middle-of-the-roaders  who  might  have  voted  according  to  other  non-political
criteria or were focused more on livelihood issues. Short in resources, the democrats
were in general weaker in mobilisation power compared with the conservative camp,
and relied mostly on cognitive mobilisation27. A minor rebound of the economy in the
summer of 2004, partly due to individual tourism and recovery from the doldrums of
the  2003  SARS  epidemic,  created  some  optimism  and  weakened  anti-government
sentiment28. Polling results showed that conservative figures that had a more upper/
middle  class  appeal  such  as  Rita  Fan  or  LP  candidates  obtained  decent  support  in
middle-class precincts, which were traditionally strongholds of the democrats. On the
whole, the strategy by the Central Government might have worked in preventing the
democrats  winning  a  resounding  victory.  Under  the  proportional  representation
system,  and  with  the  democrats  unable  to  capture  too  many  seats  in  the  FCs,  the
democrats may need a vote share of more than 70% to seize a majority, very difficult on
all counts. 
29 The outcome of the election saw a pluralisation of the political spectrum in Hong Kong.
With the increase in popularly elected seats, the proportional representation system
began  to  show  its  effect  in  representing  a  more  diversified  political  spectrum.
Traditionally,  Hong  Kong’s  political  forces  were  largely  divided  between  the  pro-
democracy and the  pro-Peking camps29.  Due to  the  economic  downturn,  the  public
began to pay more attention to bread-and-butter issues after 1997. A social-democratic
political field rose within the pro-democracy camp, as pro-democracy labour unionists
such as Lee Cheuk-yan and pro-labour politicians such as Leung Yiu-chung began to
distance themselves from the DP on class issues30. The 2004 elections returned more
pro-labour democrats to Legco, including prominent anti-government figures such as
Albert Cheng and Leung Kwok-hung (better known as “Long Hair” in the territory). The
former was  a  famous talk-show host  who achieved part  of  his  immense popularity
through his vitriolic criticisms of the SAR government and officials. The latter was a
self-proclaimed Trotskyist who had long engaged in street protests against the Central
and the SAR governments. On the other hand, the struggle against Article 23 saw a rise
in popularity of some of the prominent barristers in the territory. They and other legal
professionals formed the Article 45 Concern Group which won four seats in the 2004
elections. Figure 1 shows the new political spectrum. 
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3. Distribution of political forces within the new Legco
30 The DP saw its political influence diminished after the elections, both in Legco and
within the pro-democracy camp. Having been the flagship of the pro-democracy camp
since 1994,  the DP still  made up half  of  the 22 pro-democracy seats in the 2000-04
Legco. The 2004 elections saw the DP’s share of the vote further drop from 35% in 2000
to 25.8%, from 11 seats to 9, and it now only held about one-third of the 25 Legco seats
in  the  pro-democracy  camp.  The  pro-democracy  camp  was  on  the  whole  more
pluralised,  with  legislators  who  could  use  more  radical  action  to  challenge  the
government, and more moderate barristers likely to share similar views on class issues
with the pro-business parties. 
Impact on future political developments 
31 Peking should be reasonably satisfied with the results of the 2004 elections, with the
democrats  failing  to  get  even  close  to  a  majority,  and  the  pro-Peking  candidates
achieving good results.  Although the democrats still  won a majority of  the popular
vote, their less-than-satisfactory showing in the election weakened their claims of a
strong mandate for universal suffrage in 2007/08. The democrats’ failure to make extra
ground trapped them in the position of being a “permanent minority” and weakened
their  bargaining  power  vis-à-vis  the  Central  and  SAR governments  on  the  issue  of
future political reform. The results make give the Central Government less incentive to
make concessions to the democrats on the upcoming reform proposals for the 2007/08
elections.  It  is  unlikely  that  Peking  will  change  its  mind  on  the  issue  of  universal
suffrage  in  2007/08,  and the  election  results  might  serve  to  further  delay  political
reform in the territory. 
32 Democratic development in Hong Kong was at a stalemate after the 2004 elections. The
democrats were not strong enough to force a faster pace of democratisation, and the
election results will be unlikely to encourage Peking’s leaders to speed up reforms in
Hong  Kong.  Further  delay  in  political  reform,  however,  could  only  prolong  and
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aggravate the SAR government’s governance and legitimacy problems. The irony of the
political situation in Hong Kong is that the political grouping that consistently won 60%
or more of  popular support  is  a  permanent minority in the legislature,  and almost
totally shunned from executive office. This creates a perpetual credibility problem for
the SAR government, made all the more apparent by recent democracy movements and
post-1997 government problems. Without more fundamental political reforms, this will
continue to haunt SAR governance.
33 In  the  short  term,  the  SAR  government  is  likely  to  face  more challenges  after
September 2004 than was commonly believed. The government’s majority in Legco was
somewhat reduced. Some of the moderates/independents, who do not belong to the
pro-democracy camp, may not be able to be counted on to support the government
every  time31.  On  the  whole  Legco’s  more  pluralised  and  fragmented  make-up  may
increase  the  government’s  difficulties  in  lobbying  for  majority  support  for
controversial bills and legislation. Some of the more radical members such as Long Hair
and Albert Cheng may still pose serious challenges to the authority and legitimacy of
the SAR government. Even though Peking and the SAR government got the result they
wanted,  the  outcome of  the  September  2004  Legco elections  will  not  help  the  SAR
government solve its most fundamental problems of governance. 
 
4. Political distribution in the new Legco
NOTES
http://www.info.gov.hk/censtatd/chinese/hkstat/fas/labour/ghs/labour1_index.html
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RÉSUMÉS
The Democrats in Hong Kong failed to gain significant ground in the September 2004 Legislative
Council Elections, making only modest gains and falling far short of the legislative majority they
had hoped for. This result made it difficult for the Democrats to claim a strong mandate for more
progressive democratisation, weakening their bargaining power vis-à-vis Peking, which may in
its  turn induce  Peking  to  further  delay  political  reform in  Hong Kong. The election results,
however, did little to alleviate the governing crisis of the Hong Kong government, and a more
pluralised post-election legislature created new headaches for the government. 
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